I. How Big Is the Employment Gap? An Unusual Economic Recovery
The recovery from the 2001 recession has been very unusual. The typical pattern of aggregate employment change over the business cycle is for employment to decrease during a recession, but then to recover fairly rapidly during the subsequent recovery.
On average, non-farm payroll employment fell 2.8 percent during the eight post-World War II recessions preceding the 1990-1991 recession, but it took only 10 months on average to regain the jobs lost during the recession. The recovery from the 1990-1991 recession was an exception to the traditional pattern. Although non-farm payroll employment dropped only 1.1 percent during the downturn, 1 employment stagnated following the end of the recession. It took 23 months before the pre-recession level of employment was regained. In the meantime, many commentators declared that the economy was in a "jobless recovery."
Employment growth during the current expansion has been even more anemic than it was during the recovery from the previous recession. In August 2003, 20 months following the latest recession's end, non-farm payroll employment was nearly a million jobs below the level reached at the end of the recession and represented roughly 2.7 million fewer jobs than the pre-recession peak level of employment. So, the "job-loss recovery" became the successor to the "jobless recovery." Although there has been healthy employment growth over the last three months, non-farm payroll employment is still -as reported in early June -roughly 1.3 million jobs below the pre-recession peak level, despite the fact that the recession ended two-and-a-half years ago.
This public policy brief analyses the magnitude of the "employment gap," and the rate at which employment must grow in order to close the gap by the beginning of 2006.
Alternative Measures of Employment
There has been some controversy recently regarding whether the most commonly used data for employment growth might be underestimating the extent of job gains during the current economic expansion. Chart 1 plots three alternative measures of employment over the past 10 years. The red line shows non-farm payroll employment. This is the most commonly cited employment data series; it is derived from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' (BLS) Current Employment Statistics (CES) program, often referred to as the "establishment survey." The CES employment estimates are based on a monthly survey of the payroll records of over 300,000 business establishments. The blue line shows estimates of civilian employment based on the BLS Current Population Survey (CPS), a monthly survey of roughly 60,000 households, often referred to as the "household survey." Both employment series convey the same general message of a slow recovery from the recession (shown as the shaded area), but the household survey provides a somewhat rosier view of the post-recession period.
In addition to differences between the two data series in the trends of employment, there are differences in the levels of estimated employment at each point in time. Civilian employment measured by the household survey is greater than nonfarm payroll employment estimated by the establishment survey for the simple reason that the two series measure somewhat different concepts of employment. The household survey's measure of civilian employment is intended to count the number of people, aged 16 and over, who are engaged in civilian work, including the selfemployed, farm workers, and private household workers. In contrast, the establishment survey estimates the number of jobs, rather than the number of people employed, at private non-farm business establishments. It excludes agricultural workers, the self employed, and other non-payroll workers measured by the household survey, but it double counts people who are employed in two payroll jobs.
The green line shows household survey employment estimates that have been adjusted to make them comparable to the non-farm payroll employment estimates from the establishment survey. 2 The adjusted household survey estimates track the establishment survey estimates fairly closely through 1997, but then start to divergefirst showing less of an employment boom in the late 1990s and then less of a decline during the recession than shown by the establishment survey.
The household survey is designed primarily to measure the rate of unemployment rather than the level of employment, and its employment estimates are subject to greater sampling variation than are those based on the establishment survey. This is reflected in Chart 2, which shows the month-to-month changes in employment measured by the two surveys. The household survey's estimates are much more variable than those of the establishment survey; this very likely reflects a higher sampling error variance resulting from the household survey's smaller sample size and design geared toward measuring the unemployment rate. There are substantial differences between the mean level of monthly employment change estimated by the two surveys (as shown by the two bars on the right side of the chart), but the differences in the mean level of employment change are swamped by the large differences between the two surveys in the estimated employment change in almost any given month.
In summary, estimates from the household and establishment surveys both suggest that employment has been much slower to recover from the 2001 recession than is typically the case in economic expansions. For technical reasons associated with sample survey design, the establishment survey is a more reliable gauge of changes in employment. 2 The BLS explains the adjustments to the household series as follows: "This series represents not seasonally adjusted household survey employment that has been revised from January 1990-December 2003 to smooth out the effects of population control revisions introduced in January 2000 January , 2003 January , and 2004 . The data from 1994 forward were then adjusted to an employment concept more similar to the payroll survey by subtracting from total employment ʺagriculture and related employmentʺ, ʺthe self-employedʺ, ʺunpaid family workersʺ, ʺpaid private household workersʺ, and ʺworkers on unpaid absencesʺ and then adding nonagricultural wage and salary multiple jobholders. The resulting employment series was then seasonally adjusted." -Source: ʺBLS Household and Payroll Surveys: Summary of Recent Trends," p. 13, available at http://www.bls.gov/cps_trends.pdf
How Big Is the Employment Gap?
It is clear that the stagnation of employment during the expansion following the 2001 recession has resulted in a gap between the current level of employment and any reasonable measure of "full employment," but how big is the gap? In discussing this question, it is useful to consider recent changes in the unemployment rate and the labor force participation rate, shown in Chart 3. For implicit in the concept of "full employment" are the concepts of normal, or equilibrium, levels of the unemployment rate and labor force participation rate.
The unemployment rate increased from 3.9 percent in December 2000, prior to the recession, to 5.6 percent in the last month of the recession and then continued to increase to 6.3 percent in June 2003 before decreasing to its current (May 2004) level of 5.6 percent. It is not unusual for the unemployment rate to continue to increase past the official end of a recession, but generally the rate would have fallen closer to its prerecession value by this point in the expansion. A complicating factor is the very low value of the pre-recession unemployment rate. If, as many economists would argue, this value is lower than the unemployment rate associated with a stable inflation rate (the NAIRU, or non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment), then one would neither expect nor desire the unemployment rate to fall all the way to its pre-recession level.
The labor force participation rate decreased from 67.1 percent in February 2001, just before the start of the recession, to 66.7 percent at the end of the recession. Since that time, it has continued to fall and is now (May 2004) 65.9 percent. The sustained drop in the labor force participation rate is unusual -generally the participation rate exhibits only mild fluctuations over the business cycle.
A range of estimates of the gap between "full employment" and the April 2004 level of employment is shown in Chart 4. The baseline estimate, 5.2 million jobs, is based on an assumed value of 5.0 percent for the unemployment rate associated with a stable inflation rate (NAIRU) and an assumed value of 66.8 percent for the labor force participation rate. As explained below, the "low estimate" (3.5 million jobs) and "high estimate" (6.9 million jobs) of the employment gap are based on different, but reasonable, values of the NAIRU and normal labor force participation rate.
It is difficult to estimate econometrically a precise value of the NAIRU, and so economists vary in their preferred estimates. For this reason, we assume a higher value for the NAIRU, 5.5 percent, in our "low estimate" of the job gap, and a lower value, 4.5 percent, in our "high estimate" of the job gap. There is also disagreement about the normal, or equilibrium, labor force participation rate. We chose our baseline value of the rate, 66.8 percent, by holding the age and gender specific labor force participation rates constant at their values in 1998 (when the average value of the monthly aggregate labor force participation rates was 67.1 percent, as it was in 1997-2000), but allowing for the effects of changes in the age and gender composition of the adult population. One would expect the movement of the oldest baby boomers into the age range associated with early retirement to pull down the aggregate labor force participation rate, and this is reflected in our baseline value being lower than the average value of the aggregate labor force participation rate in the late 1990s. Surprisingly, however, there has recently been some upward movement in the labor force participation rates of people in their late 50s and early 60s (which some researchers have attributed to changes in pension plans), and so holding the age specific participation rates constant may not be appropriate. For this reason, we assume a higher value of the labor force participation rate, 67.3 percent, in our "high estimate" of the employment gap. On the other hand, one might argue that the labor force participation rates of the late 1990s were driven by unsustainably tight labor market conditions, and so we assume a lower rate, 66.3 percent, in our "low estimate" of the employment gap.
Estimates of the adult population, unemployment rate, and labor force participation rate all come from the household survey. In computing our estimates of "full employment," we first calculated the product of the household survey's estimate of the adult population, one minus our assumed value of the NAIRU, and our assumed value of the normal labor force participation rate. The resulting estimates of full employment are comparable to the employment estimates from the household survey.
However, as explained above, for technical reasons the establishment survey is a more reliable measure of employment and more appropriate to use in computing the employment gap. To make our full employment estimates comparable to the establishment survey employment estimates, we multiplied the full employment estimates by 0.9627, the average monthly value in both 2000 and 2001 of the ratio of establishment survey non-farm employment to civilian employment estimated from the household survey. 3 In calculating estimates of the January 2006 labor force, we adjusted our estimates of the equilibrium labor force participation rate downward to .666 (baseline), .671 (high estimate), and .661 (low estimate) to allow for population aging using the same methodology described above (using age-gender 
Recent Employment Changes in Perspective

What Is Driving the Drop in Labor Force Participation?
One of the most surprising aspects of the labor market situation is the drop in the labor force participation rate. Although we do not yet have a full explanation of why labor force participation has decreased, the available evidence points to diminished labor market opportunities as the primary cause. Chart 6 shows trends in the unemployment rate and the median duration of spells of unemployment. The median duration of unemployment was high relative to the unemployment rate during much of the 1990s, and it has recently been at levels usually associated with a severe recession.
To some degree, this is due to the decreased prevalence of temporary layoffs.
Traditionally, cyclically sensitive manufacturing industries used temporary layoffs as a way of temporarily reducing their payrolls during slack periods. Laid-off workers would generally be unemployed for a relatively brief period before being recalled. But blue-collar manufacturing employment is a much smaller share of total employment than was previously the case, and the share of total unemployment due to temporary layoffs has also declined. Workers who are permanently terminated, rather than temporarily laid off, need to find new job matches and can be expected to endure longer spells of unemployment.
Analysis of labor force transitions in the household survey shows that the probability that an unemployed worker will regain employment in any given month has declined sharply since the onset of the recession, suggesting that unemployed workers are having a more difficult time finding new jobs. Somewhat surprisingly, the probability that an unemployed worker will leave the labor force in any given month has also decreased. However, unemployed workers are still more likely to eventually drop out of the labor force the more months they remain unemployed. Labor force participation seems to be dropping due to the increased difficulty of finding new jobs.
Job Creation and Job Destruction
Chart 7, which presents data on rates of gross job creation and gross job destruction, provides further evidence in favor of the view that depressed labor demand is the primary factor underlying the job gap. The rate of gross job creation is equal to the number of new jobs created at business establishments expanding employment during a quarter as a percent of total employment; the rate of gross job destruction is analogously defined as the decrease in employment at all business establishments with declining employment during a quarter as a percent of total employment (the rate of net employment change is the difference between the two). As expected, during the recession the rate of job destruction increased, and then it fell to a level somewhat lower than its pre-recession level during the subsequent expansion. The behavior of job creation has been more unusual. The rate of job creation began to fall well before the start of the recession and then continued to fall during the expansion.
The anemic rate of net employment growth during much of the current economic expansion has been caused by a lack of job creation, not by an unusually high rate of job destruction. The decreased rate of job creation is also very likely a prime cause of the increased duration of unemployment spells and the decrease in the labor force participation rate. Unfortunately, at this point, the job creation and job destruction data are only available through the third quarter of 2003. As more data become available, it
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II. Outsourcing
Almost daily, we read that yet another major U.S. company has laid off several thousand U.S. workers while moving back office or skilled programming work, a call center, or even the whole corporate HR function to China, India, or some other lowwage country. Altogether, these articles suggest that an estimated 250,000 to 500,000 business service jobs have flown abroad in the past three years. Because these job shifts have coincided with the weakest U.S. job growth of any post-World-War-II recovery, many observers have concluded that job relocation overseas "explains" a major part of our job market malaise. The fact that China has a $100 billion trade surplus with the U.S.
and accounts, by itself, for one quarter of our huge trade deficit just adds to growing concerns about U.S. workers' ability to compete with developing Asia's increasingly skilled but low-cost labor force. As a result, members of Congress and state legislators are calling for -and passing --measures to stem the job flow. 1
This section of the brief reviews the available evidence on the outsourcing phenomenon. It concludes that job relocation overseas has contributed just modestly to our employment performance -both recently and over the longer term. The impact isand will likely remain -modest, in part because the trade and investment flows that facilitate foreign outsourcing trigger offsetting equilibrating forces. Historically, moreover, the integration of dynamic new regions, like Japan and Korea, into the world economy has always benefited other countries.
To address these points in more detail: Along with intense media coverage of job loss to Asia, a near-record U.S. trade deficit relative to GDP has spread the idea that "offshoring" largely explains this country's weak job growth. However, as Chart 1 suggests, the trade deficit also deteriorated very fast in the late 1990s, when job markets 1 For example, as of April 20, 2004, proposed legislation in Congress included a bill banning offshore outsourcing of federal service contracts; a bill rendering companies that have outsourced jobs in the previous five years ineligible for federal grants, contracts, loans, and other federal funding; and a bill prohibiting business enterprises that lay off a greater percentage of their U.S. workers than their workers in other countries from receiving any federal assistance. Additionally, as of May 10, 2004, thirty-one states had passed referendums banning state agencies from using offshore foreign labor. Moreover, judging by total private financial flows (Chart 4), on a net basis, the United
States remains a magnet for foreign investors because of its large market size, highly productive workforce, and ongoing supply of promising investment opportunities.
Of course, U.S. workers and voters have long since grown blasé about U.S.
manufacturing jobs going overseas as product cycles have matured and as U.S. employment has shifted from agriculture to manufacturing to services and knowledgebased activities. But despite the steady increase in FDI, jobs at foreign affiliates of U.S.
firms have stayed below 10 percent of U.S. non-farm jobs for over two decades (Chart 5).
To be sure, that share did edge up in the late 1990s, when employment was growing robustly and labor markets were tight, but then we labeled outsourcing "a welcome safety valve" that allowed us to grow faster than otherwise possible without triggering wage or price inflation. Notably, moreover, on average, and in China too, these foreign facilities sell just 10 percent of their output (in value terms) to the United States, while 90 percent goes to customers in the host country or in other foreign markets. Some of these sales to foreigners substitute for U.S. exports, no doubt, but these transactions often require parent exports of inputs, capital equipment, and supporting services. In other words, these affiliate sales generally facilitate and complement U.S. exports and support U.S. jobs.
If outsourcing per se is nothing new, what is? What's new -and troubling to
some -is that outsourcing now involves services and the export of moderately high skilled, white-collar jobs as the U.S. economy has grown increasingly knowledge-based, and as China and India have accumulated human capital. Historically, as production of shoes and toys, TVs and VCRs, semi-conductors and flat-screen monitors has moved offshore, U.S. workers have shifted to "better," more productive, higher wage jobs in burgeoning industries or to the high-value-added parts of mature industries. But now, at least some of the jobs flying overseas are the better jobs: the highly skilled, professional jobs in programming or software design, microeconomics, and radiology -the "new" imports of "other private services" from all of developing Asia, not just India and China, amounted to less than one-tenth of 1 percent of U.S. GDP. That's far too small to have had any significant impact on U.S. output or job growth.
Further, while everyone knows that this country is running a huge trade deficit overall, far fewer people seem aware that the U.S. continues to enjoy a surplus in services trade -even a growing surplus in other private services vis-à-vis the world and vis-à-vis developing Asia (Chart 7). In other words, U.S. workers remain highly competitive in high-value added services -even in Asia. 3 In addition, the job flows linked to outsourcing must be viewed in the context of the truly extraordinary dynamism of the U.S. economy, where almost one million people leave a job and almost one million people start a job every week. From time to time, over periods of a year or two, job separations may slightly exceed hires, causing employment to fall, but, over the long haul in the post World War II era, hires have exceeded separations and employment has grown decade after decade.
How has the recent bout of outsourcing affected these dynamics? Since the mid 1990s the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics has been collecting data that provide some clues. These BLS data record the reasons for all layoffs involving 50 or more workers in a five-week period and lasting more than 30 days. According to these data, import 4 Excluding all layoffs caused by temporary factors (labor disputes, repairs, etc. as well as "seasonal") raises the import competition/job relocation overseas share to almost 4 percent of "permanent" layoffs. In the mid 1980s, as Chart 10 shows, Japan's manufacturing wages were about half of the U.S. equivalent, although this wage-cost advantage was cut considerably by its lower labor productivity. In other words, the cost of the labor required to produce a given volume of output in Japan was about 70 percent of the U.S. unit labor cost. At that same time, Korea's wages were about 10 percent of U.S. manufacturing compensation, while its unit labor cost was close to 40 percent of the U.S. standard. By 2000, fifteen years later, Japan's unit labor costs had risen to match those in the United States, while Korea's unit labor costs were about 80 percent of the U.S. base. China's unit labor costs are very low now, but it is a good bet that they will rise like Japan's and Korea's before them over the next 15 years.
Over the past half decade, despite this country's increased exposure to international trade, U.S. jobs have always grown faster than the population (Chart 11).
Employment has grown fast enough to absorb a growing population and increases in labor force participation, particularly by women. This relationship held during the period of U.S. business expansion in Europe in the late 1960s and 1970s, the years of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber's The American Challenge, when Europeans were sure that Americans would wind up owning all of Europe. The relationship also held in the 1980s, the era of Ezra Vogel's Japan as Number One, when the land under the Emperor's palace in Tokyo was worth as much as the state of California, and we thought the Japanese were going to buy up much of America. And it held in the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) years, despite that giant sucking sound. None of these episodes has had any perceptible lasting impact on U.S. job growth over the decades.
The same will surely be true of China and India's emergence as economic powers.
In summary, trade and labor market data tell the same story: Domestic developments are largely responsible for the recent job-market weakness in the United
States. Looking ahead, offshore outsourcing will continue, as sources of comparative advantage shift over time. But, like all international trade, foreign outsourcing increases the productivity of U.S. workers and, in aggregate, will raise real incomes in this country. In the meantime, relatively accommodative monetary policy can hasten the reemployment of individuals hurt by trade, muting calls for costly protection. 
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III. Productivity and Costs
Thus far, we have examined and ruled out three potential explanations for the "job loss recovery" -data measurement error, labor force changes, and international trade (outsourcing). Now we turn to the last of the primary explanations being offered: productivity, which is linked inherently to labor costs and corporate profitability.
Recently, the conventional wisdom espoused in the media has turned toward productivity as the most likely reason for sluggish employment growth during this recovery. The remainder of the brief examines this hypothesis.
This section of the brief covers the topics in Box 1. First, we will review briefly the empirical evidence on productivity and employment over the business cycle. In this recovery, productivity has grown rapidly, and employment slowly, relative to past recoveries. Second, we will review the theoretical relationship between productivity and employment, and the reasons firms change them in response to economic conditions. Productivity comprises three main components: one of which is a long-run trend, and two of which are short-run, transitory responses associated with cyclical fluctuations and with unexplained factors. Third, we will consider three potential explanations for higher-than-usual productivity growth: 1) high labor costs and low corporate profitability; 2) unusual structural changes; and 3) uncertainty about the strength and durability of the recovery. Finally, we will offer forecasts of employment conditional on consensus forecasts of GDP growth and alternative adjustment paths for productivity to provide a benchmark for understanding and interpreting the employment data in the coming months. Employment has been unusually slow to recover during this cycle. The decline in employment during the 2001 recession was not unusual compared with the average decline. However, eight quarters after the peak employment was still well below its peak value, and even below the bottom end of the historical range during recoveries.
After twelve quarters (in 2004:Q1), employment was still historically low. The recent surge in employment of nearly 1 million in March through May puts the most recent quarter back into the historical range but still well below the average level during recoveries. Employment also was relatively high before the recession and thus grew more slowly than is typical heading into it. In contrast, productivity has been unusually high during the current recovery, although not quite as unusual. Since the fourth quarter after the peak, productivity has been much higher than average but still within the range of historical experience. Productivity was relatively low before the recession, and thus grew much faster than is typical heading into it.
The relatively weak recovery of employment and relatively strong recovery of productivity have been widely noted. However, some observers have gone beyond this observation to suggest that strong productivity explains the weak employment, as if the performances of productivity and employment were always mirror images of each other. This strong conclusion is incorrect, strictly speaking, but there are circumstances -like the past two recoveries -when they move in opposite directions temporarily.
Productivity essentially has been the dominant engine of growth in non-farm business output during the current recovery, as Box 3 illustrates. Output may be decomposed into three components: productivity (output per hour), hours per worker, and employment. From the recent recession trough through the end of 2003, output grew 8.5 percent. During that same period, productivity grew even more, rising 9.9 percent. The other components have declined during the recovery, hours per worker having fallen 0.6 percent and employment having fallen 0.7 percent. Although productivity typically plays a dominant role during the early stages of recovery, it is quite unusual for it to be essentially the only growing component of output.
However, the dominance of productivity in output growth during this recovery does not imply that productivity "explains" slow employment growth. Rather, firms intentionally and simultaneously choose productivity and employment (and hours per worker) when they decide to produce a certain amount of output. Only in situations where the amount of output is fixed can there be a strict tradeoff between productivity and employment -and even then, only if hours per worker are fixed too. More generally, firms choose to produce a certain amount of output by weighing carefully the costs and benefits of relying on each component. (See Box 3.) In the long run, output, productivity, and employment all tend to move together in the same direction. However, when demand for output falls below the potential level of output the economy can produce, as in recessions and early recovery stages, firms face limited demand for their output. In these circumstances, firms can choose to respond to demand by adjusting any one of the three components of output. So, during this "job loss recovery," the key question is: Why have firms chosen to respond to increasing demand entirely through higher productivity rather than by raising employment (or hours per worker)? The answer to this question will explain both relatively weak employment and relatively strong productivity during this recovery. In other words, productivity does not explain the behavior of employment, but rather some other factor explains the behavior of both.
To gain a better understanding of the answer to this question, consider the decomposition of productivity depicted in Box 3. First, we separate long-run and shortrun movements. Then we identify the component of short-run movements that can be linked directly to business cycle fluctuations. The remainder of the short-run component is the part of productivity that cannot be explained by economic theory and data.
Trend productivity grows in the long run through the stock of capital -through technological change embodied in physical capital, through improved worker skills in human capital, and through improved methods of combining physical and human capital in organizational capital. In the long run, employment is positively correlated with trend productivity. The short-run component of productivity is the transitory deviation of productivity from trend. The cyclical part of productivity is determined by firms' responses to changes in business cycle conditions. Firms alter the intensity of effort by their workers to avoid costly firing and hiring decisions during temporary downturns in economic activity, and they reallocate workers between alternative production activities and locations in response to these downturns. Cyclical productivity is the portion correlated with key macroeconomic variables.
Our best estimates indicate that trend productivity growth probably increased significantly sometime in the latter part of the 1990s, as shown in Chart 2. Estimating trend productivity is tricky, and there are several ways to do so. We use a statistical procedure that maximizes the chances of finding the most significant trend changes without imposing our preconceived notions on the data. 1 The procedure suggests that trend productivity has been growing 2.9 percent per year since 1997. Our estimate uses productivity data only through 2002 because the estimate of recent trend productivity is very sensitive to the final data points, and the most recent data are based on preliminary data and thus expected to be revised the most. For example, using data through 2001 yields no second break in productivity but rather a continuation of the 1-1/2 percent trend (shown on the graph by extending that trend line). In contrast, using data through 2003 yields an even higher productivity trend of 3-1/2 percent. With estimates ranging from 1-1/2 percent to 3-1/2 percent over a three-year span of sample endpoints, actual trend productivity growth should be viewed as quite uncertain, and conclusions about it should be cautious and tentative. We return to this important point later.
The recent estimated trend is strikingly similar to the 2.7 percent pace estimated prior to the productivity slowdown that began around 1973. 2 This similarity raises the question of whether the recent increase in trend productivity is a new development, as is often described within the context of discussion about "The New Economy," or a return to the usual long-run trend that prevailed at least since World War II. Regardless of which interpretation is correct, however, the recent increase in trend productivity should lead to an increase in employment, not a decrease, at least in the long run. And, is conceivable that the higher trend productivity enabled firms to cut employment temporarily more than they normally would have during the recession and subsequent recovery. Nevertheless, a trend-productivity-induced reduction in employment almost surely would be short-lived because higher trend productivity is ultimately good for economic growth. Rather, higher trend productivity makes sluggish employment growth even more puzzling. Thus, slow employment growth during the recovery is more likely related to short-run factors such as the business cycle or some other unexplained factor.
One important effect of higher trend productivity on the cyclical behavior of employment is to raise potential output growth. If potential is higher, then actual GDP must grow even faster to raise employment than it would with lower trend productivity and potential output growth. Chart 3 illustrates this idea using the unemployment rate.
If actual GDP grows faster than potential, then the unemployment rate tends to fall, and vice versa. If potential GDP growth has increased, as denoted by the "high potential Assuming trend productivity growth increased significantly, we can evaluate the implications for short-run movements in productivity depicted in Chart 4. The top graph plots the total short-run component of the level of productivity (cyclical plus unexplained, thick blue line) and the cyclical component only (thin blue line). The graph shows, in percentage terms, how far productivity is from its long-run trend. Not surprisingly, productivity is relatively high -more than 3 percent above trend. But it is not unusually high, as it reached this level during several other expansions, including during the early 1990s. This conclusion, however, depends critically on higher trend productivity. If trend productivity were still growing at the slowdown rate of 1-1/2 percent, the deviation of productivity from trend would be more than twice as high now. Similarly, if trend productivity growth were significantly higher than 3 percent, then the short-run component would be much smaller. Thus, the higher is trend productivity growth the less evidence there is of an obvious productivity puzzle that can explain unusually slow employment growth.
Nevertheless, the recent surge in productivity over trend is not well explained by the business cycle. Given recent business cycle conditions, productivity should be only about 1 percent above trend during this recovery, a relatively weak rebound compared with other business cycle episodes. 3 Thus the unexplained component -the gap between total short-run productivity and cyclical productivity -is relatively high during this recovery, as can be seen in the bottom graph (black line). Unexplained productivity has been unusually high in two respects. First, it reached nearly 3 percent and has only approached this level two other times since the early 1950s. Second, it has been positive since 2000, a fairly long stretch for the unexplained component to be "one-sided." This result could occur because trend productivity growth has been even higher than we estimate, or because there has been a persistent change in the behavior of cyclical productivity that we have not properly captured.
The analysis thus far leads us to ask: How can we interpret the recent unusual surge in unexplained productivity, and commensurate weakness in employment? Box 4 lists three potential explanations for consideration during the remainder of the presentation:
1.
Firms are facing unusually high labor costs, and thus raising productivity to raise profits. We think this explanation is unlikely.
Although some benefit costs are rising sharply, total labor costs are growing much more slowly than productivity, so unit labor costs are falling and profits are booming. If anything, this appears to be a good time to hire new workers because they are relatively inexpensive. If trend productivity growth has increased significantly, hiring new workers looks even more attractive. (Of course, the reverse is true too.)
2.
Firms are facing a period of unusual structural change that requires massive reallocation of employment and heroic levels of productivity 3 The regression equation used to identify the cyclical component includes lagged values of the output gap, unemployment rate, capacity utilization, inflation, interest rates, inventory-to-sales ratio, and the corporate profit rate. It was estimated through 2000:Q4, so the estimated cyclical component during the recent business cycle is constructed with data from outside the estimation period. This approach means that recent estimates of the cyclical component assume there has been no change in the cyclical behavior of productivity during this recovery. Although this assumption could be incorrect, the approach provides a baseline for evaluating the extent to which the evidence might point to a structural change in the cyclical behavior of productivity.
to maintain output. We think this explanation is unlikely as well. As pointed out earlier (Section I, Chart 7), the pace of job reallocation is unusually low, not high as some observers have suggested. Job destruction has been relatively low, but job creation has been extraordinarily low during this recovery, so these data indicate clearly that very little structural change has been occurring. They also do not support the hypothesis that weak employment growth can be accounted for by transitory surges in productivity that are attributable to large shifts of workers to higher productivity jobs. Because the data stand starkly against it, we do not address this idea further.
3.
Firms are uncertain about current economic growth and demand for their products and thus are reluctant to hire workers. Although we cannot prove this hypothesis conclusively, we think at least some aspects of it may have some validity. Certainly, a good deal of legitimate economic uncertainty still lingers despite strong growth during the past year. As discussed earlier, the actual rate of trend productivity remains rather uncertain over a wide range (1-1/2 to 3-1/2 percent). Furthermore, although real GDP has been growing relatively strongly, much of the strength is attributable to highly stimulative fiscal policy. Given budget deficits and other long-run government spending constraints, it is unclear how long this fiscal stimulus can continue and whether the private sector can grow robustly without it.
Finally, geopolitical risks do not seem to have subsided materially. For all of these reasons, and potentially others, firms may be reluctant to hire workers at this time when they might have to fire them in the near future because it is costly to hire and fire workers. Instead, firms may see further productivity gains as a safer, less costly alternative strategy in the uncertain short run.
Chart 5 reveals how favorable labor costs are for firms, and how profitable firms are as a result. The top graph plots actual productivity growth against the two most common measures of total labor compensation (that is, wages and salaries plus all worker benefits) in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. 4 Both measures indicate that real labor costs are growing around 3 percent. In the simplest of economic theories about the demand for labor, labor productivity and real labor compensation should grow at the same rate, but productivity is growing much faster (more than 5 percent) than real labor compensation. In other words, workers are generating more revenue through higher productivity than firms have to pay to compensate them. As a result, corporate profits are growing quite rapidly, as the latest data reveal in the bottom graph.
Although total labor costs are relatively low, firms clearly are concerned about some benefit components of labor costs that are rising rapidly. Chart 6 shows the evidence on two of the most nettlesome benefit costs, insurance and retirement, and compares them with wages and salaries. The top graph reveals that both costs grew at double-digit annual paces through 2003 -insurance, dominated by health care factors, grew 10 percent, and retirement grew 12.5 percent -while wages and salaries only grew 3 percent.
A surge in health care costs is not new. These costs also surged in the early 1990s
(not shown), and firms made adjustments to their provision of these benefits to reduce costs, so we might expect a similar response this time. The escalation of total retirement costs is more unusual. As the bottom graph shows, defined contribution costs grew 1.8 percent in 2003, but defined benefit retirement costs have shot up 30.6 percent.
Undoubtedly, firms are concerned about this development and are taking actions to change their cost structures in much the same way they respond higher to health care costs. But it seems unlikely that skyrocketing defined benefit retirement costs could elicit the kind of unusually weak aggregate employment recovery we have seen, simply because they are very small, accounting for only 1.3 percent of total labor costs in 2003.
More importantly, high defined benefit costs probably cannot explain firms' reluctance to hire new workers (recall from Section I that job creation is the real problem) because firms could choose not to offer defined benefit retirement plans to new employees. In fact, firms increasingly have been making exactly this choice at least since 1996 when defined benefit costs amounted to 2.7 percent of total costs. Some commentators have argued that complex pension accounting and funding problems have been exacerbated by the stock market decline and have led to overstated profits.
Neither we, nor anyone else, have been able to demonstrate convincingly yet how these problems explain the breadth and depth of weak employment growth during this recovery.
We now turn to some evidence in support of the idea that uncertainty about economic growth might be at least part of the reason that the unexplained component of productivity has been so large during the current recovery. The basic idea is that firms and Medicare funding troubles were likely to limit severely the ultimate magnitude and especially the duration of the fiscal stimulus. Thus, firms might reasonably be expected to view the fiscal stimulus as transitory, and there is some evidence of this. 6
Chart 7 depicts the relationship between fiscal policy and productivity by plotting real disposable income (personal income less personal tax payments, adjusted for inflation), along with productivity growth. 7 To emphasize the underlying highfrequency trends in the face of unusual fluctuations in these data, we plot the twoquarter percent changes. 8 Productivity and real disposable income growth have been very positively correlated during the current recovery, as Chart 7 shows, with two notable fluctuations in productivity corresponding with the two periods when personal tax cuts took effect. While productivity growth has been high on average during the recovery, it has fluctuated between very high (5 percent or more) and moderately high (3 percent), or about the same as the newly estimated productivity trend.
The correlation between productivity and disposable income during this recovery might have been coincidental or it might have been caused by a third factor common to both. However, it is also conceivable that firms perceived the tax cuts, as well as their effects on consumer spending and output, to be transitory. If so, firms may have decided to meet the perceived transitory increase in consumer demand with transitory increases in productivity rather than by hiring new workers and risking the need to fire them later. If firms somehow demanded greater (uncompensated) work effort from employees temporarily, or devoted more time to developing new ways to organize and streamline production activity (organizational capital) temporarily, then unexplained productivity would rise because these factors are not captured in the longrun trend or short-run cyclical components of productivity.
Although speculative, this uncertainty hypothesis has important implications if it is correct. In Chart 7, the cross-hatched forecast bar represents the forecast of disposable income growth as of March, and the solid bars represent the forecasts as of June. Actual 7 Real personal consumption growth is very similar to real disposable income growth and thus is omitted. 8 In addition, we adjusted the 2001 personal tax payment data to smooth the highly uneven nature of quarterly tax payments. This adjustment highlights the relevant trend movements in disposable income facing consumers, most of whom probably understand the implications of the uneven quarterly tax payments for their average income and consumption behavior during the year. In early April, it was unclear whether employment would grow substantively any time in the near future, but then we learned that payroll employment increased 947,000 in March through May. This recent employment rebound seems to suggest that uncertainty about the strength and stability of the recovery probably has at least partly, if not entirely, dissipated. The employment simulations in the next chart will provide some perspective on this. Ultimately, however, a more complete understanding of the role of uncertainty about the recovery will only emerge when the effects of tax cuts, both personal and corporate, finish working through the economy this year and next.
To conclude our analysis of productivity and employment, we close with second key assumption is that the long-run productivity trend is 2.9 percent. Thus, our employment forecast assumes the GDP forecast is correct and that productivity follows a pre-specified adjustment path to its new, higher long-run trend. 9
Given this GDP and productivity forecast, we project monthly employment for three simulated productivity paths from April 2004 through December 2005. The blue bars show actual payroll employment changes, with the lighter bars in April and May denoting actual data during the simulation period. 10 In the first path, productivity reverts to its long-run trend in a manner similar to the early 1990s (yellow lines). In April (dashed employment line), we assumed it would take two quarters before returning to the estimated trend. But employment changes in March through May have been less than half the simulated value, and thus they argue for a slower reversion to trend. Consequently, the June simulation (solid employment line) assumes that it takes three quarters for productivity to revert to trend. In the second path, productivity continues from its current level along the new higher trend (green lines). In the third path, productivity is assumed to have achieved yet another higher trend growth rate, this one equal to the 4.7 percent rate observed during the "job-loss recovery" (purple lines). Although we are skeptical of this third alternative because it involves an implausibly high growth rate, we show its implications for employment to balance euphoric expectations about trend productivity.
If productivity reverts quickly to its long-run trend, as is common during recoveries, and the GDP forecast is correct, employment will increase rapidly (more than 500,000 per month) in 2004 and then increase at the lower end of the Blue Chip forecast range (108,000 to 213,000 per month) or below it. As of early April, this forecast implied employment growth for April 2004 through March 2005 of 3.8 million (2.9 percent). As 9 We could forecast GDP growth independently along with employment and productivity growth. However, we take the consensus forecast as given because we do not have an independent model of employment growth that would provide good rationale for a better alternative GDP growth forecast. 10 Because employment data are available monthly and productivity data are available quarterly, the actual employment data cross over into the first quarter of the forecast period. This overlap provides a benchmark with which to interpret the assumed productivity paths.
of early June, this forecast implied employment growth for this period of 5.4 million (4.1 percent). Both employment forecasts are well above most other employment forecasts.
On the other hand, if productivity growth continues on a 2.9 percent trend from its current level without any cyclical adjustment to the level, the forecast of employment change is very modest. Employment change would start around 150,000 per month and eventually fall below the Blue Chip range within a year. Total employment change for twelve months in this forecast would be 1.4 million (1.1 percent), just about enough to absorb an average year of labor force growth. If productivity were to continue to grow at the same remarkably high rate as it has achieved during the recovery, then the recovery wouldl continue to be one with "job loss" at an increasing pace. In the unlikely event this occurred, we would be even more "at a loss" to explain the boom in productivity.
Actual employment change averaged 316,000 during March through May. This pace is about half way between the two scenarios with a 2.9 percent growth rate.
Because GDP growth appears to be very close to its forecast, productivity growth likely slowed significantly in 2004:Q2 -closer to zero, but perhaps not actually declining.
Two relatively simple explanations can reconcile the employment and productivity data in 2004:H1. One is that productivity is reverting to trend, but the trend is higher than our estimate of 2.9 percent. In this case, productivity does not have to decline much, if at all, and thus employment will not increase as much as might be expected under the trend-reversion hypothesis. Given the uncertainty about trend productivity estimates and given that it is only very recently that we can accept the hypothesis of a higher trend rate, it seems risky to bank on even higher trend productivity growth. A second explanation is that the employment growth reflects a diminution, but not elimination, of uncertainty about the strength and stability of the current recovery. Resolution of uncertainty might be occurring partially across all firms, or disproportionately across some firms for which economic conditions have become clearer. In either case, if the resolution of uncertainty is only partial then productivity might remain relatively high and adjust to trend more slowly than we have assumed.
Chart 5
Productivity is growing faster than labor costs, and profits are surging, which would suggest firms would demand more labor. 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 During this recovery, firms raised productivity much faster than trend primarily in periods when tax cuts stimulated consumer demand. 
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Chart 8
Given consensus GDP forecasts, employment growth will depend on how the current level of productivity adjusts to its trend. 
Summary
• Recent productivity gains reflect increases in the trend, cyclical, and unexplained parts
• Faster trend productivity means GDP must grow faster than it has to raise employment significantly
• The unexplained productivity surge remains a puzzle, but it may be related to uncertainty about the recovery
• Employment should continue to grow more rapidly in 2004, but the exact pace depends on the strength of final demand and how productivity adjusts
